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I am pleased and honoured that The Community of Advantage is the subject of this 
collection of insightful papers (Sugden 2018). It is particularly appropriate that 
the symposium is published in what is coming to be known as the Journal of Civil 
Economy. The understanding of economic life as cooperation for mutual benefit that 
I am trying to express through the phrase ‘community of advantage’ is in the same 
spirit as ‘civil economy’, the name that Antonio Genovesi—the Neapolitan who was 
the world’s first university professor of economics—wanted to give our discipline.
In this paper, I explain how the ideas in my book fit into the broad landscapes 
of normative and behavioural economics. I have the sense that some of my fellow 
behavioural economists see my approach to normative issues as not so much con-
tractarian (which it professes to be) as contrarian. Undoubtedly, I deviate from what 
has become the mainstream position of behavioural economics. But that may reflect 
the fact that, although I have been a practitioner of behavioural economics since 
the pioneer era of the 1980s, I have worked at the interface of economics and phi-
losophy for even longer. Much of my work as a philosophical economist has been 
concerned with concepts of liberty and opportunity. I will try to explain how these 
investigations have influenced my understanding of the normative implications of 
the findings of behavioural economics.
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1  What is behavioural economics?
The title of my book is taken from a passage in John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Political 
Economy, in which Mill describes international trade—and, by implication, the market 
system—as a ‘community of advantage’ (1871/1909, Book 2, Chapter 17, Sect. 5). My 
subtitle, A Behavioural Economist’s Defence of the Market, was chosen to suggest that 
the ideas in the book would be controversial. I considered an alternative, ‘A behavioural 
defence of the liberal tradition of economics’, which would have been intellectually 
more precise but less arresting. What I wanted to convey was my opposition to the fash-
ionable view that the findings of behavioural economics undermine a tradition of eco-
nomics that goes back to Mill, Adam Smith and Genovesi, in which the market system 
is viewed favourably (which is not to say uncritically). I wanted to say that it is possible 
to be both a behavioural economist and a liberal economist.
What is a behavioural economist? The term ‘behavioural economics’ seems 
to have been introduced in the 1990s in a re-branding exercise. The aim was to 
separate two programmes of experimental research which, up to then, had shared 
the name ‘experimental economics’. One programme, particularly associated with 
Vernon Smith, was to keep the name ‘experimental economics’. The other, par-
ticularly associated with Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, was to become 
‘behavioural economics’. In a paper explaining this separation, George Loewen-
stein (1999: F25) defines a behavioural economist as ‘an economist who brings 
psychological insights to bear on economic phenomena’. I think that is an apt 
definition. It is in that sense that I can claim to be a behavioural economist.
However, I recall a conversation with Kahneman in the early 2000s in which I 
asked him how he would define behavioural economics. He wanted to exclude Mau-
rice Allais’s (1953) discovery of the common consequence and common ratio effects 
from the canon of behavioural economics, even though his and Tversky’s experimental 
replications of those effects were two of the central exhibits of their ‘prospect theory’ 
paper—the paper that most behavioural economists regard as a founding text (Kahne-
man and Tversky 1979). Personally, I have to confess, I was more concerned that Kah-
neman classified Graham Loomes’s and my regret theory as non-behavioural (Loomes 
and Sugden 1982). His explanation for these exclusions was that theories of rational 
choice were not behavioural. Allais had used the common consequence and common 
ratio effects to justify a theory of rational choice that did not include the independence 
axiom. Loomes and I had explicitly presented regret theory as ‘an alternative theory 
of rational choice under uncertainty’. My response (which did not persuade Kahne-
man) was that prospect theory and regret theory had both been constructed by using 
expected utility theory—the standard theory of rational decision-making—as a tem-
plate and then adding particular psychological mechanisms (loss aversion and prob-
ability weighting in one case, regret in the other).
I now see that there is a significant difference between the way that rationality is 
treated in those two papers. After describing the differences between prospect the-
ory and expected utility theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 277) conclude:
These departures from expected utility theory must lead to normatively unac-
ceptable consequences, such as inconsistencies, intransitivities, and violations 
1 3
Normative economics without preferences 
of dominance. Such anomalies of preference are normally corrected by the 
decision maker when he realizes that his preferences are inconsistent, intran-
sitive, or inadmissible. In many situations, however, the decision maker does 
not have the opportunity to discover that his preferences could violate decision 
rules that he wishes to obey. In these circumstances the anomalies implied by 
prospect theory are expected to occur.
For many years, I read this passage merely as a tactical concession to rational 
choice theorists, suspecting that it might have been written to accommodate a dif-
ficult referee. Taken at face value, however, it says that prospect theory is a theory of 
error, and that error can be defined relative to the correct theory of rational choice, 
namely expected utility theory.
In contrast, Loomes and I claimed that regret theory was a (not the) theory of 
rational choice: it was a model of a psychologically explicable form of behaviour 
that could not reasonably be deemed irrational. We presented this model as a coun-
ter-example to the claim that transitivity, independence and respect for first-order 
stochastic dominance were necessary properties of rational preferences. Around the 
same time, we developed a parallel theory of ‘disappointment’, in which preferences 
that we claimed were rational contravened the sure-thing principle—just about the 
only major rational-choice principle that regret theory did not violate (Loomes and 
Sugden 1986). We thought that, by bringing psychological insights about regret and 
disappointment to bear on economic phenomena, we had shown the implausibil-
ity of conventional claims about the normative status of expected utility theory—
including those made by Kahneman and Tversky in the passage I have quoted. This 
is certainly an enterprise of behavioural economics according to Loewenstein’s defi-
nition. In any case, it would be odd to treat acceptance of the normative status of 
a non-psychological theory as a defining characteristic of the branch of economics 
that makes use of psychology.
For the first two decades after the publication of Kahneman and Tversky’s ‘pros-
pect theory’ paper, behavioural economics was almost entirely concerned with 
investigating and explaining facts of human behaviour; it did not engage with nor-
mative issues. Whether the regularities of behaviour that were being observed were 
errors relative to some true concept of rationality was not a major issue. But this 
changed in the early 2000s when attention turned to what I have called the reconcili-
ation problem—the problem of reconciling normative economics with the empirical 
findings of behavioural economics.
2  Neoclassical welfare economics and social choice theory
From the 1930s to at least the 1980s, there was a clear consensus among economists 
about the theoretical framework within which normative analysis was conducted. 
This framework rested on a very parsimonious conceptual scheme, essentially as 
follows.
A society consists of a set of n individuals. A social state is a possible descrip-
tion of society. This may be a single description (for example, ‘the socialist party 
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forms the government’) or an n-tuple of individual-specific descriptions (for exam-
ple, specifying each individual’s bundle of consumption goods). For each individ-
ual, there is a binary relation of preference over the set of all relevant social states. 
Preferences are complete (that is, the individual can rank each pair of social states in 
terms of preference or indifference) and integrated (that is, non-stochastic, context-
dependent and internally consistent in the sense defined by axioms such as transi-
tivity and the sure-thing principle). An individual’s preferences are revealed in the 
choices she makes from opportunity sets of feasible objects. Normative economics 
is concerned with the social ranking of social states. The Pareto principle prescribes 
that if all individuals weakly prefer some social state x to another social state y, 
then x is socially ranked at least as highly as y; if in addition at least one individual 
strictly prefers x to y, then x is ranked strictly above y. Most applications of norma-
tive economics accepted this principle.
However, this conceptual scheme was open to a range of different interpretations, 
each of which was compatible with the standard neoclassical theory of individual 
behaviour. It was possible, and indeed quite common, for economists to use the 
scheme without saying how they interpreted it.
Crucially, the concept of preference could be interpreted in different ways. On 
some readings of revealed preference theory, preference means choice (subject to 
some qualifications about indifference): to say that a person prefers x to y is to say 
that if she faces the opportunity set {x, y}, she in fact chooses x. On another inter-
pretation, a preference is a mental state that tends to cause choice: to say that a per-
son prefers x to y is to say that she is psychologically disposed to choose x from {x, 
y}. On a third interpretation, a preference is an individual’s subjective judgement 
about her welfare: to say that a person prefers x to y is to say that, in her judgement, 
x would be better for her than y. If individuals are self-interested and rational in 
the sense of neoclassical theory, these interpretations are observationally equivalent. 
The person’s judgement that x is better for her than y provides her with good reason 
both to be disposed to choose x rather than y and to act on that disposition.
The concept of a social ranking was equally open to different interpretations. On 
one interpretation, it is a normative judgement made from a neutral viewpoint by a 
‘social planner’ or ‘ethical observer’: to say that x has a higher social ranking than 
y is to say that, as judged by a neutral observer, x is better for society than y. On 
another interpretation, it is an aggregation of individuals’ preferences: to say that 
x is ranked above y is to say, roughly speaking, that there is a greater weight of 
preference on the x side than on the y side. (Needless to say, the meaning of such 
an aggregation depends on how the concept of preference is interpreted.) On a third 
interpretation, a social ranking is the actual result of some (or perhaps of a recom-
mended) collective choice mechanism: to say that x is ranked above y by some spe-
cific mechanism is to say that that mechanism would choose x from {x, y}.
The open-endedness of the concepts of preference and social ranking left room 
for many different interpretations of the Pareto principle. If a social ranking is a 
‘better for society’ judgement made by a neutral observer, the Pareto principle 
might be a normative principle prescribing respect for individuals’ choices, disposi-
tions or subjective judgements. Or it might be a normative principle requiring the 
observer to take account of each individual’s welfare, defined in some objective 
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sense, combined with the assumption that individuals in fact tend to prefer what is 
objectively good for them. If a social ranking is an aggregation of preference, the 
Pareto principle might be a minimal, non-normative aggregation principle. (If some 
component of an aggregate increases in quantity and if no component decreases, the 
aggregate increases.) If a social ranking is the result of a recommended collective 
choice mechanism, the Pareto principle might be a minimal normative condition of 
democracy. (Voting rules should be such that, if a social decision has to be made 
between x and y, and if no one votes for y and at least one person votes for x, then x 
should be declared the winner.)
The variety of interpretations of the Pareto principle allowed a corresponding 
variety of interpretations of the First Fundamental Theorem of welfare economics—
the theorem that every competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient. In particular, it 
could be interpreted as a conclusion about how competitive markets contribute to 
social welfare, or as a conclusion about the tendency of such markets to respect con-
sumer sovereignty by responding to individuals’ actual demands. Thus, economists 
could agree that the First Fundamental Theorem picked out a desirable feature of 
markets without actually agreeing about what that feature was.
Some of the tensions in economists’ apparent consensus about normative analysis 
began to emerge in the 1970s and early 1980s, when social choice theory was one of 
the most fashionable areas of economic theory and a topic of interest to many phi-
losophers. But developments in behavioural economics revealed more fundamental 
problems. The long-standing consensus was based on a shared sense that choice, 
preference and welfare were closely related. But a recurring finding of behavioural 
economics is that individuals’ choices are sensitive to features of the ‘context’ or 
‘framing’ of decision problems that seem to have no relevance to individuals’ inter-
ests or well-being. The implication is that individuals often do not have the kind of 
preferences that economists have traditionally assumed when treating preference as 
the central concept in their normative analyses. Something in the consensus position 
has to be given up. Choosing what that should be, and so finding a way forward for 
normative economics is the reconciliation problem.
3  Non‑meddlesome preferences and the problem of the Paretian 
liberal
My approach to this problem builds on what I learned through my involvement 
in debates about the interpretation of the concepts of ‘individual preference’ and 
‘social ranking’ that took place among social choice theorists in the 1970s and 
1980s. A theorem due to Sen (1970), ‘The impossibility of a Paretian liberal’, crys-
tallised some of the central issues in these debates and was the subject of my first 
work in the philosophy of normative economics. Let me explain.1
1 This section is based on Sugden (1985), which provides more detail about these debates. I have re-used 
some text from that paper.
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For Sen, this theorem was part of a research programme grounded on the belief 
that normative economics, as practised at the time, had too narrow an ‘informational 
base’. Sen shared the consensus view that normative economics was about social 
rankings of social states, but challenged the ‘welfarist’ assumption that, in arriving 
at judgements about social rankings, the only relevant information was information 
about individuals’ preferences. His theorem is intended to show that the welfarist 
approach cannot take account of widely shared moral intuitions about the value of 
individual liberty.
Since Sen is presenting an impossibility result, he defines what he sees as a mini-
mal condition of social respect for liberty. His condition of minimal liberty is that 
there should be some protected personal sphere for each of at least two individuals 
in society. Which individuals should have this privilege, and what should belong 
to their personal spheres, is left open, so on the face of it this is an extremely weak 
requirement. A personal sphere is to be understood as a nonempty set of pairs of 
social states. If some pair of social states {x, y} is deemed to belong to person i’s 
sphere and if i prefers x to y, then x must be socially ranked above y. Sen (1982, p. 
286) says that the minimal liberty condition is intended ‘to permit each individual 
the freedom to determine at least one social choice, for example, having his own 
walls pink rather than white, other things remaining the same for him and the rest 
of the society’. The theorem shows that, for any society and for any specification of 
personal spheres that satisfies the minimal liberty condition, there is some profile of 
individual preferences such that either the Pareto principle is violated or the social 
ranking contains a cycle.
In my contributions to the debate about the theorem, I gave prominence to the 
following example, based on one originally presented by Gibbard (1974). In a strict 
sense, it is not a proof of Sen’s theorem, but it illustrates the theorem’s underlying 
normative logic. The example should be read in the context of the marriage norms 
of the 1970s. There are three unmarried individuals, Annie, Bill and Charlie. Three 
alternative social states are feasible: that no one marries anyone, x; that Annie mar-
ries Bill, Charlie remaining single, y; and that Annie marries Charlie, Bill remain-
ing single, z. On any normal conception of liberty with respect to marriage, every 
individual has the right to stay single if he or she so chooses, and any adult man 
and adult woman (if not close relatives and not already married to anyone else) 
have the right to marry if they both choose to do so. The first of these propositions 
fits naturally into Sen’s conception of the personal sphere. Consider any two social 
states that differ only in respect of whether a particular man is married to a par-
ticular woman—for example, x and y, which differ only in respect to the marriage 
or non-marriage of Annie and Bill. It would be in the spirit of Sen’s characterisa-
tion of liberty to say that either Annie’s preferring x to y or Bill’s preferring x to y 
is a sufficient condition for x to be socially ranked above y. Indeed, Sen (1982, pp. 
299–302) seems to endorse this formulation in a discussion of liberty in relation to 
marriage. An analogous formulation of the second proposition would be to say that 
if the only difference between two states (such as x and y in the example) is whether 
a particular man and woman are married to one another, and if both of them prefer 
being married to one another to remaining single, then this is also the social ranking.
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As I like to tell the story, Annie and Bill are long-standing friends. Annie would 
like the two of them to marry. Bill would prefer the relationship to continue without 
any commitment, but would rather marry Annie than lose her altogether. Charlie 
admires Annie and would like to marry her. Annie is fond of Charlie and would set-
tle for him if it was clear that Bill would not marry her. Representing this familiar 
triangle in terms of transitive individual preferences: Annie prefers y to z and z to x; 
Bill prefers x to y and y to z; and Charlie prefers z to x. In one possible version of 
the story, Charlie (perhaps modelling himself on the hero of Dickens’s Tale of Two 
Cities) self-sacrificingly prefers y to z. This leads to a variant of Sen’s impossibility 
result. Socially, z is ranked above x (because this is the shared preference of Annie 
and Charlie) and x is ranked above y (because this is Bill’s preference). But if the 
social ranking is also required to satisfy the Pareto principle, y is ranked above z, 
producing a cycle.
However, I would rather have Charlie believing that he is the right man for Annie, 
and so I tell the story with Charlie preferring z to x and being indifferent between x 
and y. Forget about social rankings for the moment and ask what would happen if 
these preferences were common knowledge and if Bill and Charlie were both free to 
make proposals of marriage to Annie. Charlie has nothing to lose by proposing. If 
Bill expects Charlie to propose, the best he can do it to propose too. Having received 
both proposals, Annie will accept Bill. (If the story were set on 29 February, when 
by tradition women propose to men, Annie’s best strategy would be to propose to 
Bill, making it clear that if he rejected the proposal she would propose to Charlie. 
The result would be the same.) So, by permitting marriages to be arranged by a 
propose-and-accept rule, society allows y (Annie marries Bill) to come about when 
x (no one marries anyone) is feasible. But Bill prefers x to y. If we accept Sen’s 
characterisation of liberty, respect for Bill’s liberty requires that x is socially ranked 
above y: we must conclude that the workings of the propose-and-accept rule have 
violated Bill’s protected personal sphere. Now the paradox is not an inconsistency 
between liberty and the Pareto principle; it is that Sen’s characterisation of liberty is 
telling us that, if society is to protect individual liberty, it cannot allow marriages to 
be formed by free choice and mutual consent. Another way of expressing the sense 
of paradox is to say that the liberty that (supposedly) has not been respected is Bill’s 
freedom not to marry Annie, but Bill has in fact chosen to marry her. Has he invaded 
his own personal sphere?
Sen’s impossibility result initiated a huge literature in which social choice theo-
rists tried to find coherent ways of representing individual liberty. Most contribu-
tions to this literature framed this problem in the same way that Sen had done—as 
a problem of arriving at a social ranking of social states, using information about 
individuals’ preferences over those states. For many writers, the starting point was 
the recognition that that Sen’s result (along with a whole range of related puzzles) 
is possible only if some individuals have strict preferences over pairs of states that 
belong to other individuals’ personal spheres. (In the first version of my example, {x, 
z} belongs to Annie’s and Charlie’s spheres, but Bill prefers x to z; {x, y} belongs to 
Annie’s and Bill’s spheres, but Charlie prefers y to x.) Such preferences were often 
characterised as ‘meddlesome’. One response was to look for ways of editing (or 
‘laundering’) individuals’ preferences so as to remove elements of meddlesomeness 
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before using them as inputs to the formation of social rankings. Sen’s liberty princi-
ple might then be retained by applying the Pareto principle to laundered rather than 
actual preferences. Another response was to argue that if, in some domain of life, an 
individual is sufficiently meddlesome, his or her right to a protected personal sphere 
should be deemed to have lapsed. The Pareto principle might then be retained by 
restricting the scope of the liberty principle. (Compare the popular view that the 
rights of free speech and assembly should not be given to anti-democratic organisa-
tions.) A third response, in the spirit of Sen’s critique of the overly narrow informa-
tional base of welfare economics, was to argue that the social ranking should take 
account of the intentions and motivations that lie behind meddlesome preferences. 
(Does Bill’s preference for x over z reflect spite, jealousy, or just a desire to maintain 
a long-standing friendship?) Increasingly complex—not to say baroque—formula-
tions of liberty were proposed, discussed, and found to generate yet more paradoxes.
An initially small minority of theorists, of whom I was one, argued that the source 
of the problem was the presupposition that respect for liberty should be represented 
as a relationship between individual preferences and social rankings (Nozick 1974, 
pp. 164–166; Sugden 1978, 1985; Gärdenfors 1981). Although we never managed 
to persuade Sen, we did convince three of the leading social choice theorists of the 
time (Gaertner et al. 1992).
Our argument was that liberty is a property of the procedure that determines 
which social states come about, and so is a relationship between individuals’ choices 
(not their preferences) and social outcomes (not rankings). As Peter Gärdenfors 
pointed out, procedural properties of social choice can be represented using the the-
oretical framework of game forms—that is, games with the same properties as those 
of classical game theory, except that outcomes are described in physical terms, rather 
than as profiles of players’ utilities. In this conceptual scheme—sometimes called 
the game form approach—individuals’ preferences play no role; ‘social’ judgements 
are not about the outcomes of a society’s decision-making procedures, but about the 
procedures themselves. In the case of marriage, respect for individual liberty makes 
certain requirements of the procedure by which marriages come about. Specifically, 
the marriage of any single and adult man and woman should occur if and only if 
they both choose to marry. Either version of the propose-and-accept rule satisfies 
this requirement. In the example, the social state that comes about—Annie marries 
Bill, Charlie remaining single—does so through the workings of a procedure that 
respects individual liberty. That is all that needs to be said. Viewed in the perspec-
tive of liberty, Annie, Bill and Charlie’s preferences, intentions and motivations have 
no bearing on the case.
In some respects, the game form approach is aligned with a way of thinking that 
became important in moral and political philosophy around the same time as the 
debates I have described. This was the idea that each individual’s well-being or 
‘advantage’ should be assessed in terms of the opportunities from which she can 
choose, rather than in terms of the outcomes she experiences. This idea is central to 
John Rawls’s theory of justice, in which holdings of ‘primary goods’—things that 
‘normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life’—are the metric of 
advantage (Rawls 1971, p. 62). It is also central to Sen’s (1985) theory of capabil-
ity, in which a person’s advantage is assessed in terms of the set of combinations of 
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‘beings and doings’ from which she can choose. This new interest in opportunity 
prompted a line of research whose aim was to find ways of measuring the extent or 
value of opportunity that is provided by a person’s opportunity set. As a contributor 
to this research programme, I argued that the extent of an individual’s opportunity 
should be assessed without reference to her actual preferences, but only in terms of 
what is ‘normally’ or ‘reasonably’ preferred by people in general (Jones and Sugden 
1982; Sugden 1998).
However, the example of Annie, Bill and Charlie illustrates the limitations of an 
approach to normative analysis that assesses each individual’s opportunity set inde-
pendently of those of other people and then looks for a fair or equal distribution of 
opportunity. The problem is that the contents of each individual’s opportunity set 
depend on the choices that other individuals make from theirs. Given the propose-
and-accept rules for forming marriages, an individual’s opportunities to marry are 
not simple properties of his or her opportunity set. For example, Charlie’s oppor-
tunity to marry Annie is an opportunity for him to marry her if she also chooses to 
marry him. Given Annie’s preference for Bill, the opportunity set that Charlie faces 
as an individual is less rich than Bill’s. Nevertheless (and contrary to the position 
that seems to be taken by adherents of the ‘involuntary celibacy’ movement), I think 
we should say that the propose-and-accept rules treat Bill and Charlie equally. The 
interrelatedness of opportunity sets is crucial for the analysis of market opportuni-
ties in The Community of Advantage.
But let me take a step back and consider some of the general methodological 
features of the controversy about how to formulate principles of individual liberty. 
The original problem was to give a formal representation of an intuitive normative 
principle—the principle that society ought to respect individuals’ personal spheres. 
Social choice theorists tackled this problem within a pre-existing conceptual frame-
work in which normative judgements are expressed in social rankings and social 
rankings depend on individuals’ preferences. Accordingly, they tried to represent the 
intuitive principle as a particular kind of relationship between preferences and social 
rankings. It turned out that this representation captured the intuition only if indi-
viduals’ preferences had certain properties of non-meddlesomeness. Many theorists 
seem to have concluded from this that the principle itself was applicable only if pref-
erences had those properties. They responded by proposing analyses which either 
‘corrected’ individuals’ preferences to fit the representation, or disqualified non-fit-
ting preferences as normatively unacceptable, or required investigations into indi-
viduals’ intentions or motivations as a means of deciding whether particular pref-
erences should be respected. Intuitively, none of these proposals seems compatible 
with the simplicity of the original principle—the principle that in certain personal 
matters, individuals should be left free to make their own choices. The game form 
approach cuts through these problems by representing that principle in a different 
conceptual framework—a framework that does not refer to individuals’ preferences 
and does not look for social rankings of social states.
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4  Latent preferences and the reconciliation problem
I now return to the reconciliation problem. In 2003, two remarkably similar propos-
als for tackling this problem were published in American legal journals (Camerer 
et al. 2003; Sunstein and Thaler 2003). Each of these papers had a prominent legal 
scholar (Cass Sunstein in one case, Samuel Issacharoff in the other) as one of its 
authors. The other authors were leading American behavioural economists: Rich-
ard Thaler (writing with Sunstein) and Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, Ted 
O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (all writing with Issacharoff). The titles of these 
papers were similar in intent: ‘Libertarian paternalism’ and ‘Regulation for conserv-
atives’. The common idea was that behavioural economics could justify interventions 
in the economy (paternalism, regulation) that neoclassical economists had tradition-
ally opposed, and that those justifications were immune to the kinds of objections 
that might be raised by thinkers on the political right (libertarians, conservatives). 
Both papers were written as manifestos for an approach that I will call behavioural 
welfare economics. This approach has subsequently become mainstream within 
behavioural economics and, especially after its popularisation in Nudge (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008), widely accepted in policy-making circles.
This approach is premised on the assumption that (in Thaler and Sunstein’s words) 
‘individuals make pretty bad decisions—decisions that they would not have made if they 
had paid full attention and possessed complete information, unlimited cognitive abili-
ties, and complete self-control’. Public policy, it is argued, should be designed to coun-
ter individuals’ tendency to make bad decisions. Crucially, its aim should be to ‘make 
choosers better off, as judged by themselves’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 5; italics in 
original). Or, as Thaler (2015, p. 326) puts it, he and Sunstein ‘just want to reduce what 
people would themselves call errors’. The implication is that an individual’s judgements 
about what makes her better off are expressed in the choices she herself would make in 
the absence of errors induced by inadequate attention, information, cognitive ability and 
self-control. By abstracting from the effects of these errors on observable choice behav-
iour, analysts can reconstruct individuals’ latent (or ‘underlying’ or ‘true’) preferences 
and use those preferences as data for normative economics. Similarly, Camerer et  al. 
(2003, pp. 1217–1218) say: ‘[A] large part of behavioural economics describes ways 
people sometimes fail to behave in their own best interests… It is such errors—apparent 
violations of rationality—that can justify the need for paternalistic policies to help peo-
ple make better decisions and come closer to behaving in their own best interest’.
Camerer et  al. present behavioural economics as the latest step in a series of 
advances in economics, each of which has relaxed some assumption that had previ-
ously been a standard feature of economic theories. They characterise the ‘simplest 
models in economics’ as assuming perfect competition, perfect information and per-
fect rationality. From the 1930s, economists began to develop models of imperfect 
competition. From the 1970s, economists began to develop models of imperfect 
information. Now (as viewed from 2003), behavioural economics is making a fur-
ther advance: ‘Relaxing the assumptions of perfect rationality represents a logical 
next step in this productive progression. The scientific consolidation of psychologi-
cal findings into a new brand of behavioural economic theory breathes new life into 
the rationales for paternalistic regulation’ (p. 1218, italics in original).
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Although Camerer et al. do not quite say this explicitly, the suggestion seems to be 
that the assumptions of the pre-1930 models supported the view that the market sys-
tem, if left alone, would tend to produce socially desirable results, and that governments 
should therefore take a broadly laissez faire approach to the regulation of markets. Mod-
els of imperfect competition and imperfect information in turn provided rationales for 
new and more interventionist forms of regulation. Camerer et al. are presenting behav-
ioural economics not only as a further stage in the progress of scientific understanding, 
but also as a further stage in the recognition of sources of market failure and of the need 
for interventionist economic policies. As I sense it, the sub-text—one that is common 
to a lot of work in behavioural welfare economics—is that the findings of behavioural 
economics undermine traditional arguments in favour of markets.
How do Sunstein and Thaler’s and Camerer et al.’s approaches relate to neoclassical 
welfare economics? It seems clear that both sets of authors are trying to arrive at norma-
tive judgements about what is better or worse for society, made from a neutral viewpoint. 
In Sunstein and Thaler’s (2003) paper, this is the viewpoint of a ‘planner’—someone 
who ‘must design plans for others’ (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 1190); in Nudge, it is 
the viewpoint of a ‘choice architect’. Camerer et al. do not say explicitly who (apart from 
themselves) ought to make these judgements but, from the first sentence onwards, it is 
clear that their topic is ‘regulation by the state’ (p. 1211). By implication, their viewpoint 
is that of a publicly authorised regulator. The idea of making neutral judgements about 
the social good fits with one of the standard interpretations of the social rankings that 
feature in neoclassical welfare economics, as described in Sect. 2.
For Sunstein and Thaler, at least, it is clear that the data from which these social 
rankings are to be constructed are individuals’ subjective judgements about their 
own welfare.2 This matches one of the standard interpretations of the individual pref-
erences that are the basis of neoclassical welfare economics. In neoclassical welfare 
economics, preferences are assumed to be complete and integrated. Whenever Sun-
stein and Thaler draw concrete recommendations about public policy, they assume 
that individuals’ judgements about their own welfare have those same formal prop-
erties. The difference is that, in neoclassical economics, preferences are assumed to 
be revealed in choice; there is a background presumption that revealed preferences 
are broadly consistent with conventional rational choice theory. In contrast, the start-
ing point for behavioural economics is a rejection of that presupposition: far from 
choosing rationally, individuals make pretty bad decisions. Sunstein and Thaler 
close the gap by postulating latent preferences that have the properties that neoclas-
sical economics attributes to revealed preferences. The concepts of ‘error’ and ‘bias’ 
are then brought in to explain why latent preferences are not revealed in choice.
However, much of the evidence that Sunstein and Thaler present in support of the 
claim that individuals make bad decisions is not evidence of identifiable errors of 
knowledge or reasoning. Some of it is merely evidence that people make decisions 
that, as judged by those authors (and probably by many of their readers) are imprudent 
2 Camerer et al. are less precise about the data they want to use. In their account, a fully rational indi-
vidual acts on well-defined preferences which represent her ‘best interests’. Her best interests correspond 
with ‘true costs and benefits’ to her, but ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ are never defined (pp. 1214–1215).
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or foolish. For example, in arguing for nudges against obesity-inducing diets, drinking 
and smoking, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, pp. 7, 44) simply report familiar statistics 
about the associated health risks and then conclude: ‘With respect to diet, smoking, 
and drinking, people’s current choices cannot reasonably be claimed to be the best 
means of promoting their well-being’ (pp. 7, 44). Notice the unstated assumption that 
a person’s choices ought to reveal her judgements about the best means of promot-
ing her well-being. The obese forty-a-day smoker (we are told) cannot reasonably 
believe that he is choosing what is best for his well-being, and therefore must be mak-
ing what he himself would call an error. (My guess is that Sunstein and Thaler would 
hypothesise that the error was a failure of self-control, acknowledged as such by the 
smoker himself. But perhaps the smoker has unreasonable beliefs that seem reason-
able enough to him. Or perhaps he is perfectly well aware that he is not promoting his 
long-term well-being but just doesn’t feel any inclination to change his behaviour.)
Other evidence, which Sunstein and Thaler interpret as showing the effect of 
‘biases’, is more accurately characterised as evidence that individuals’ choices are 
influenced by contextual features of the decision-making environment that irrelevant 
for the choosers’ welfare. Consider their favourite example of the cafeteria customer 
whose choices between food items depend on the prominence with which they are 
displayed (pp. 1–2). The psychological mechanism at work here is clear enough: when 
choosing among positively-valued items, people are more likely to choose those to 
which their attention is most directed. But that does not tell us how much attention a 
person should give to each item, and so does not tell us which choices are biased and 
which are not. The idea of bias presupposes a concept of truth, but empirical psychol-
ogy does not provide—and has no need for—a concept of true preference.
My diagnosis is that Sunstein and Thaler (and behavioural welfare economists 
more generally) are running up against difficulties that are inherent in their concep-
tion of latent preference. If latent preferences are to serve the purposes for which 
they have been invoked, each individual’s latent preferences need to have four prop-
erties that do not easily coexist. First, they must be complete and integrated (at least, 
within the policy domains to which they are to be applied). Second, they must rep-
resent that individual’s subjective judgements about her own well-being. Third, they 
must represent the choices that that individual would in fact make in the absence of 
identifiable errors of information, reasoning, attention or self-control. Fourth, those 
errors must be ones that the individual herself recognises as errors. In The Commu-
nity of Advantage, I say more about the difficulties of using latent preferences as the 
building blocks of normative economics.3
5  How the two problems are similar
I can now explain the parallels that I see between the two sets of problems I have 
discussed—those that social choice theorists faced in the 1970s and 1980s in formu-
lating principles of individual liberty, and those that behavioural welfare economists 
now confront when they use the concept of latent preference.
3 My discussion of this topic in the book is based on Infante et al. (2016).
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Normative economics without preferences 
Ever since Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, there has been a tradition of lib-
eral economics in which competitive markets have been viewed favourably. Some-
thing of that intuitive idea is expressed in Smith’s metaphor of the invisible hand 
that leads market participants to promote the interest of society even though that is 
no part of their intentions (Smith 1776/1976, p. 456). A different aspect of that intui-
tion is expressed in Smith’s characterisation of the market as a system of ‘natural 
liberty’, in the more modern metaphor of consumer sovereignty, and in economists’ 
long-standing professional aversion to paternalism. Roughly, the thought is that mar-
kets provide individuals with opportunities to buy whatever they would like to buy 
and to sell whatever they would like to sell. In providing these opportunities, mar-
kets respect individuals’ authority to judge what is best for themselves without hav-
ing to justify those judgments to anyone else.
Since the ‘marginal revolution’ of the 1870s, economists have represented these 
pro-market intuitions in a theoretical framework in which rational agents act on 
well-defined preferences. That representation works only to the extent that neoclas-
sical assumptions about individuals’ preferences are seen as an adequate approxima-
tion to reality. The findings of behavioural economics cast doubt on the adequacy of 
those assumptions. Many behavioural welfare economists seem to have concluded 
that the intuitive ideas expressed in the two metaphors are applicable only if pref-
erences have the neoclassical properties. Recall the same slippage between mod-
els and the reality they represent in social choice theorists’ interpretations of Sen’s 
impossibility result.
There are also similarities between the theoretical strategies that have been used 
in response to the two problems. Recall how some social choice theorists concluded 
that an individual’s liberties could or should be protected only if his preferences 
were non-meddlesome. Analogously, some behavioural welfare economists con-
clude that sovereignty can or should be allowed only to rational consumers. Camerer 
et  al. (2003) draw this conclusion particularly starkly. They propose an approach 
of ‘asymmetric paternalism’ in which the fundamental asymmetry is between ‘fully 
rational’ consumers, who should be left free to make their own choices, and ‘bound-
edly rational’ consumers, who should be the target of paternalistic regulations.
Recall how other social choice theorists concluded that principles of liberty 
should be defined so that social rankings respect individuals’ preferences only after 
those preferences have been laundered to remove elements of meddlesomeness. 
Analogously, the dominant view in behavioural welfare economics is that social 
welfare judgements should respect individuals’ preferences only after those prefer-
ences have been laundered to remove the effects of error. In both cases, individuals’ 
actual preferences are being found not to fit a pre-existing theoretical scheme. In 
each case, the diagnosis is not that there is a flaw in that scheme, but that the prefer-
ences that fail to fit it are at fault.4
The game form approach resolves the problem posed by Sen’s impossibility result 
by moving outside the conceptual framework of preferences and social rankings and 
4 This feature of some common arguments in behavioural economics has been pointed out by Berg and 
Gigerenzer (2010), Infante et al. (2016) and Rizzo and Whitman (2020).
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instead considering relationships between the choices that individuals make and the 
outcomes that result from those choices. If one wants to know whether liberal intui-
tions about the desirable properties of markets remain true, given the findings of 
behavioural economics, it is natural to use a similar approach. That is the approach 
that I have been following since the early 2000s, and which has led to The Com-
munity of Advantage. I do not try to attribute true preferences to people who often 
seem not to have such things. I do not imagine myself as a benevolent social planner 
or regulator, trying to maximise a neutral conception of the social good. I ask how 
far markets provide individuals with opportunities for interactions that, as viewed by 
each participant and for whatever reason he or she thinks important at the time, are 
mutually beneficial.
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